Oh, History. Jockeying to find a space from which to talk about you.

How can one speak of history if there is no such thing? That is, if we understand history as constituted by multiple discourses produced about the past –and through these discourses, any narrative or enunciation regarding the past is always a product of perceptions, of judgments both collective and subjective, bound by prior and current authorities of influence, institutional knowledge and its methods, its discursive limitations and possibilities, and the temporal and spatial specificity from which one speaks, among other factors that make each enunciation unique, thereby silently speaking through it—then how can one position a beginning within the mess, while sensing that we are already in medias res? From where and when do we speak, knowing full well that, once finished, our speech will always be incomplete? Locating such a strategic origin from which to speak about the past would prove undoubtedly bound to similarly complex conditions that mould one’s discursive practice about history, and that risk failing logical coherency by the time we are done speaking about it. Though these are not necessarily negative consequences for positioning our beginning, let us restate the question: how can one speak of history if there is no such object of study that shows itself, except in false totality, as a straw-man of discursive practices aimed at describing the past, questioning its accidents and occurrences, the force of its change, its inconstant ruptures, its discontinuities, its shadowed patterns of similarity dispersed across time?
This problem is immediately troubling, though perhaps liberating, on at least two accounts. Firstly, the conditions and circumstances mentioned above that speak through a discourse produced on history – although only partially evident to the one who speaks about it, and to a greater or lesser degree attributable to influences contingent upon the site of complex forces acting through the speaking subject— can never be perceived in absolute form. That is, from the conditions that bind any discursive practice to its circumstance, we may take comfort and caution in awareness that we too are undoubtedly subject to a realm of possibilities and influences beyond our conscious register. Yet, when considering what lies exterior to one person’s contribution to this discourse, beyond one speaking subject who chooses history as his or her “object,” the immediacy of this interconnectedness between the speaking subject and his or her context becomes prevalent; this leads me to a second, more pressing matter. Because the events of the past are not fictitious, but did indeed happen —despite the possibility that historical accounts are bound to similar discursive conditions as narrative fiction, making history readable, perhaps to some, like a strange genre of objective literature— there remains a gamut of ethical considerations in assuming all history is literature, or perhaps even fiction. For while history is weighted with the gravity of past events –in the extreme case, we need to look no further back in time than twentieth-century history, its wars and armed conflicts, its mass death and regimes of oppression, to be reminded of the present circumstance— any regard for history as an inexistent object of study should not dismiss the very real, and often traumatic, consequences it has produced in collective and subjective experience. If we choose to conceive of history as an inexistent object —one that has produced a vast field of discourse attempting to make sense of it— consisting of events that have produced and continue to produce horrors, pleasures, and a range of very real affects known to human experience, we risk conflating the past with a fiction that unfolds out of pure determined force, like the plot of a story whose ending is already known to us. What’s at stake, aside from the grave pitfall of believing that history follows any sort of determined course or progress, is the willful surrender of one’s own recognition as being subject to history, provided with the possibility of beginning speaking about it, yet stripped of a partial consciousness that we too are conditioned by its very interstices.


















































